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DONALD LANGEVOORT* 
CRIMINALIZATION OF CORPORATE LAW 
The Impact on Director and Officer Behavior 
As WE GO DOWN THE TABLE, I SUSPECT WE ARE ALL GOING to be reframing a lot of 
points already made rather than making new ones, and I confess that is what I am 
about to do. 
I fall on the side of the skeptics about whether criminal liability in financial 
reporting cases is a healthy tool because I have doubts about whether judgments 
are likely to be proportionate. And proportionality is a very important measure in 
criminal law for two reasons. First, we expect the punishment to fit the crime as a 
matter of justice. Secondly, if we have disproportionately harsh treatment, then the 
behavior of officers and directors in response to over-deterrence is that they will 
pay too much attention to matters that are precautionary as opposed to profit-
generating. I And the point of a business is to be entrepreneurial. That is a fairly 
familiar point, but worth emphasizing. 
Why do I say proportionality is going to be problematic? I think there are three 
layers of ambiguity in any complex criminal trial that is likely to lead to judge or 
jury decision-making that imagines something rather than assesses it accurately. 
One is ambiguity as to the motive. It is very easy in hindsight to say "look at the 
stock options-that was the motive for the financial misreporting." That suggests 
greed, and so that is a very salient story about motive. But my sense is that there are 
often many motives. Looking at many of these scandals, the companies were in a 
desperate growth and/or survival mode during the times they engaged in financial 
misreporting.2 Yes, the growth was fueled by options plans but, in fact, internally 
there was also a perception that there was going to be a shake out in their industry 
in three years, and if they were not one of the winners, they were not going to be 
around. They were in part, at least, doing it for their shareholders. That is a very 
Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. See Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 
WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 511-12 (2001) (stating that officers/directors will expend resources to engage in monitor-
ing practices to the extent the cost of such expenditures is less than the gain in terms of liability). The logical 
extension is that where over-deterrence exists, the officers/directors will spend more time and resources on 
precautionary measures. 
2. See, e.g., Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 
2002, § I, at 1; Carrie Johnson & Christopher Stern, Adelphia Founder, Sons Charged; Family Looted Sixth-
Largest Cable TV Company, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, July 25, 2002, at AI; Simon Romero, Worldcom Facing 
Charges of Fraud: Inquiries Expanded, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at AI. 
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different motive, and far less venal. That would not excuse a crime, but it changes 
the emphasis, and hence one's assessment of what went wrong. 
A second ambiguity relates to the so-called "badges of guilt."3 That is a famous 
evidentiary point. Judges and juries look for certain things that tell them this was 
bad, this was evil-and the person accused of the crime obviously knew it. Con-
cealment, secrecy, little bits of deception are traditional markers of fraud. 4 But, of 
course, in a highly competitive business environment, the way you compete is often 
by deceiving your competitors as to matters such as research and development and 
marketing plans. Business people make it a natural part of their strategy not to 
show all their cards all the time. More importantly, they believe that you win by 
not showing all your cards. In hindsight, then, lack of candor is often very easy to 
find. But this often just shows business norms at work, and does not necessarily 
prove fraudulent intent. 
Finally, there is the ambiguity of harm. If we ever took seriously the notion that 
we want to see a proximate link between what the defendant did and the alleged 
harms (for instance, $30 billion of losses to Enron investors),S we would have to 
admit that there were many causes, and isolating anyone is bound to be mislead-
ing. In fact, $30 billion may itself be a misleading way of looking at losses. But a 
number like that grabs a jury's attention. 
I think when you put these three ambiguities together, the likelihood that you 
are going to have truly "proportionate" decision-making is minimal. 
My final point just connects to Michael [Klausner's]. I think we have had a fail-
ure in the civil enforcement system, and that is what has put so much pressure on 
criminal law to respond. It is not because the law hasn't provided for good civil 
remedies. For forty years or so, the SEC has the power to seek disgorgement of any 
ill gotten gains from any individual wrongdoer.6 1t is not that they cannot, it is they 
have not always gone aggressively after the individuals as opposed to the company. 
One reason for this is because they settle their cases and, just as we talked about 
earlier, it is much easier to settle with other people's money, (i.e., the shareholders) 
than it is to settle based on an executive's real money out of pocket. It takes a 
politically committed prosecutor or plaintiff to say I am going to take a risk rather 
than pursing the path of least resistance. You did not always see that from the SEC. 
If the government had historically done a better job in the civil area I think a lot of 
the pressure would be taken off. The SEC is getting better about this, but it is a 
fairly recent phenomenon. 
3. See Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1997-99 (2006). 
4. See Murphy v. Crater (In re Crater), 286 B.R. 756, 764 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) (categorizing the tradi-
tional "badges of fraud" into three types-the first type being concealment and deception). 
5. Bank of America to Pay $69 Million to Settle Enron Suit, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2004, at C2. 
6. Matthew Scott Morris, Comment, The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 
1990: By Keeping Up With the Joneses, the SEC's Enforcement Arsenal is Modernized, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 151, 
168 (1993). 
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